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Portugal

// Information about Portugal during the world war two.

In a period of great change in Europe, Portugal is obliged, through its Head of State, António de Oliveira Salazar, managing a neutrality between two groups with interests in Portugal. 

During the conflict, there were several problems in Portuguese politics. Among them the issue of Timor and the problems of tungsten and the Azores.

War in Portugal

The problems of Portuguese foreign policy has always been referred to the background in favor of other issues considered most relevant. But the Spanish Civil War has changed this reality. From 1936, Salazar calls itself the foreign folder (until 1947) and the war (until 1944). The Portuguese diplomacy will then be governed by a series of basic guidelines for the national interests:

  • Neutralize the neighboring Spanish (thanks to the signing of the Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression in March 1939, reinforced by an additional protocol in July 1940 and later by the creation of Peninsular Block in December 1942).
  • Building on the secular Luso-British alliance in order to protect and preserve national sovereignty.
  • Buy time in order to manage the best possible way, on behalf of Portuguese interests, the complexity related to the status of neutrality (...) and take advantage of the asset that the special geographical position of Portugal and its Atlantic islands represent. [1] .

In 1936 the Republican forces and the Spanish nationalists armed conflict. By many considered inevitable, this confrontation has given the tone for the birth of very striking ideological divisions in Europe. 

Salazar remains neutral in relation to conflict, but strives to help the nationalist forces, giving them facilities near the border with Portugal. Some thousands of Portuguese volunteers they even fight alongside the Spanish stealing huge praise from Salazar at the end of the war in Spain, when the victory of the nationalists. 

Moreover, the ideological affinities between the two Iberian regimes will remain in post-war, as can be seen this speech Marechal Carmona, on the position of the Iberian Peninsula in the war - in Si fuera presunción too much for you that nosotros respecta yo ambicionaria to cure Europe Mientras sus Heridas, fuera la Peninsula reserve ideal y una mansion orden y social discipline. Franco en Portugal, p. 27">[2]. 

On the other hand, the same idea of cohesion existed Iberian by Franco, who proclaimed in Portugal (...) quiso Dios y el don concedernos Celestre peace because of it, determined to mantenerla trance at all, in another en el apoyamos feel firm una amistad nacida nuestro of historical destiny común of nuestra y del vencidad geographical parallelism nuestras Instituciones policies. [3]. 

But in 1939 begins World War II. On September 1, Hitler's armies invaded Poland and sow the seed of what would become a war on an unprecedented scale. 

Never combining any of the blocks, Salazar adopted an ambiguous position throughout the war, (...) taking advantage of strategic interest to the Atlantic islands making up the account and stop on the Azores. Salazar turns out to be a master of pragmatism in the conduct of foreign policy, not without leaving flags stir feelings of affinity and favorable to the Axis or the Allies around him. [4].Salazar also says: The government will consider as the highest service or the greatest grace of providence to maintain peace for the Portuguese people (...) [5]. 

However, it should be borne in mind that the cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy during the Second World War is the Luso-British alliance, concluded the treaty of Windsor.This alliance, which remains steady during the conflict, expresses well the dependence of the Portuguese society for the British Empire. However it is extremely important for the British during the war, since it has a key role in the defense of economic and strategic interests of England in Portugal. Likewise, Portugal's won nothing to end the alliance, so take your loyalty to it: For me (...) I take both breasts faithfully fulfill the duties of the alliance as not to leave, for the honor and interest of both parties, corrupt it (...). [6]. May consider the alliance as the force balance between the Luso-British relations. The ideological differences between the English and the Estado Novo regime readily legitimize a series of suspicious. Like the other schemes of the allies (with obvious exception of the USSR), the English rule is democratic, liberal and parliamentary, while Salazar is assumed to be critical of democracies - If there is a fact borne out by experience, is that democracy and liberalism exhausted in the last century. [7] - and leader of an undemocratic regime, illiberal and unparliamentary. Who are ideologically distant the two regimes, there are other ways to approach that end, to a point, to allow overtaking these differences. Economic interests and the appointment of renowned ambassadors between the two countries have resulted in a mutual tolerance and permissiveness policy. 

On the other hand, should be considered just as important to the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression (Iberian Pact) signed between Portugal and Spain to March 17, 1939, the result of politically active Portuguese neutrality. 

About the relations between Portugal and its Spanish neighbor, said Salazar, 22 May 1839: Portugal and Spain are forced to live next door on the peninsula, the good or bad neighborhood favors us or hurts us both. Many times in eight centuries of Portugal fought against Spain or against Spanish states to maintain or consolidate their independence. (...) Irremovivelmente two independent states, two nations fraternal solidarity. [8]. 

This treaty will help decisively to neutralize the Iberian Peninsula:

  • It serves the English, because the nationalist Spain away from Germany and maintains free access to the Mediterranean. It also ensures the protection of his interests in the Azores, central to the control of the North Atlantic. This is one of the main objectives of the English, and to expect to achieve Salazar's your pivot, taking income from all diplomatic skills. (...) Dr. Salazar is conceivable that one man is able to devote ago him the entire nation and possibly prevent the Franco commit some folly; [9].
  • Serve the Portuguese, it strengthens the security and guarantees the inviolability of national territory. The concern with the Spanish neighbor decreases. They were already notorious ideas of annexation of Portugal, aiming to unify the Iberian peninsula, starting to worry the Portuguese head of state: Salazar is absolutely aware of the draft annexation fed by some members of the phalanx and the Falangist youth. [10]. Salazar is aware that could, initially, to keep Spain out of Portugal and the Iberian Peninsula out of the war.Serving Portuguese interests and appeasing British interests, Salazar reflects on the strategic issue of the peninsula in the war and the treaty with Spain: Whoever has reflected in English and traditional policy towards essentially defensive of their international action will have been able to understand how England should consider the establishment of true peace zone in the peninsula, as one of the states is his old ally and the other was always his friend. [11]. However, worries constantly disconnect from Franco's Spain and affirm their loyalty to the Luso-British alliance, because while the Civil War dragged on (in Spain) (...) the Portuguese and British governments deepened the problems of alliance and friendly cooperation in studying issues related to the defense of both countries. (...) This simple fact (...) is clearly indicative of how we understand ourselves in maintaining the constant in our history, ensuring fidelity to the covenant Luso-British defense of common interests (...). [12].

Finally, the unilateral declaration of Portuguese neutrality for the European conflict, issued by Salazar in the National Assembly, also serves to England. First, because the fragile Portugal represent more of a burden than a help. But also because the entry of Portugal into the war alongside the British could take the Spaniards to join with Hitler. 

Salazar is thus seeking a neutrality that allows relations with all the warring states, in order to make economic compensations of the war. If Portugal has a duty to avoid being led astray by the general unrest [13] also (...) our comprehensive universal extension of our interests and allow the best and most friendly relations with all states. [14].

 

Decision of Neutrality

On September 1, 1939 gives the beginning of a war that, first of all, is strongly influenced by ideology, put in direct confrontation democracies and totalitarian regimes. 

In this context, Portugal seeks to define its position in the conflict: if, ideologically, the Portugal authoritarian, undemocratic and illiberal seems closer to Germany and Italy, on the other, the danger exists that the annexation Franco's Spain (supported by Axis) makes provide an alignment on the Allied side. In this perspective, any slope can bring danger and jeopardize the system, so we try to keep Portugal out of the war, adopting a neutral stance in the conflict. Salazar says, in the National Assembly on 9 October 1939: Germany has made ??us know that they were prepared to respect the integrity of Portugal and its overseas possessions in case of neutrality, England asks nothing in return for the secular alliance and friendship we oblige the conflict (...). The government could well express the country's determination and the hope of maintaining peace in the Portuguese people, unless the dignity, interests or our duties in it were to cause abandonment. [15]. 

The declaration of Portuguese neutrality allows Portugal to assume a posture of detachment for England, since, unlike the First World War, the declaration of neutrality is not subject to British approval. On the other hand, it gives rise to the broadening of the scope of relations with other powers, and hence an approximation to the totalitarian states, whom Salazar is arguably closer ideologically. 

Serving, as already stated, the British interests of the neutralization of the Iberian Peninsula, neutrality is legitimized in its bilateral nature, because there is an alternative to the alliance, was, by contrast, the expression of its vitality, and although based on the conjunction Portuguese and British interests, did not bring any embarrassment to the relations between Germany and Portugal.[16]. 

Thus, Portugal is in a position to declare its neutrality with regard to the European conflict.

 

The Evolution of Neutrality Portuguese From September 1939 to Summer 1940

Since the beginning of the war until the summer of 1940 the Portuguese regime maintains good relations with Britain, which, moreover, does not seem very concerned about the German propaganda in Portugal. Has in its favor the good political relations with the regime, good relations with the economic circles of our country, the weight of the Luso-British alliance, the negative effect of the German attack on Poland, taken as a Catholic and conservative and the negative effect of the covenant German-Soviet. 

At this stage, the Portuguese neutrality is not (as had been the First World War) completely subordinated to British interests. With regard to economic interests, in many respects differs from the First World War, Salazar appears to be inflexible and unbridgeable. In this field, the head of state of Portugal strives to get the maximum economic benefits of neutrality in exchange for a policy that provides flexibility. Thus, Portugal has economic relations with all the belligerent countries, achieving thus be spared the strongest and negative economic effects of war. 

These relationships are possible due to the cunning and the ambiguity in the way of negotiating Oliveira Salazar. If, on the one hand says its goodwill with regard to British interests, on the other turns a blind eye to smuggling German Portuguese coast. 

There are few authors who, however, admit and defend the existence of a discrete anglofilismo. In this sense, we highlight the role of Peter Teotónio da Silva, the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, and Armindo Monteiro, minister of foreign affairs until 1936, and ambassador to Portugal in England until 1943. About the latter, be justified from the placement of a brief excerpt from a letter to Salazar on the Portuguese foreign policy, and elucidating its inclination Anglophile: And note well that Your Excellency's neutrality has long been considered (.. .) an institution of the past, (...) I have always advocated a policy that, although neutral, is clearly in favor of England. [17]. 

It is undeniable that the posture of Armindo Monteiro is clearly favorable to the government in London. About a speech that Salazar was poorly received by England, Campbell arrives as to say that my impression is that Dr. Miller shares at least some of our views on the speech of Dr. Salazar, and I hope to support personally my repairs. [18]. 

This position Armindo Monteiro some friction to the Portuguese government to cost him his job as ambassador in 1943.



From July 1940 until the end of 1942

From July 1940, when the fall of France, a new strategic context and new data are changing the Portuguese foreign policy. Germany fighting the Battle of Britain, and Blood, sweat and tears of Churchill, with the help of the Royal Air Force (RAF), will able to maintain inviolate the English soil. 

The German Panzers await the order to carry out Operation Felix [19] and invaded the Iberian Peninsula. The incessant demands of the Spanish Falangist Franco media have aggravated the situation: it is feared a joint attack on German forces in Portugal and Spain. The passage of neutrality with non-belligerence of Spain is interpreted by many as a prelude to this attack. The pressures from the Spanish Portuguese government is felt: the June 26 Ambassador Teotonio Pereira is warned by Spanish Interior Minister, Serrano Suner (Franco's brother) that Portugal should fear a German attack is our nation persists in alliance with England. 

The July 6, is the proper counseling Teotonio Pereira Franco in the same direction. Salazar focuses well in keeping Spain out of war and Franco to hold against the pressure axis. 

However, it signed the Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact, which commits both countries to a position away from the conflict, and to safeguard the mutual interests (...) to focus together on the best means of as possible to safeguard their mutual interests, whenever you provide or verify facts which by their nature may compromise the sanctity of its metropolitan territory or pose danger to the security or independence (...) or drag any of them to an international conflict with others . [20]. If, on the one hand, this additional protocol ensures Salazar lull trends attach Spain, on the other hand is also seen as a victory for Franco, who, in a clear demonstration of its inclination to the axis forces, reports Berlin protocol in these terms: Portugal was partially diverted from the British orbit and launched in our direction. [21]. 

However, the constant threat of German armies in the Pyrenees can not be ignored. 

Thus, Portugal finds himself torn between the hypothesis of an approach to the allies - at the risk of being invaded by Spain and Germany and lose their independence and empire - or ally with the Axis and lose the Atlantic islands and see and Angola Mozambique passed into the hands of South Africa 

Although Salazar always strive to convince Franco that the neutrality of the two countries is the only way to save and protect the Iberian Peninsula, the caudillo continues to try to negotiate the entry of Spain into the war on the side of Germany in exchange for some economic benefits and territorial (as in Morocco), the Germans insist on not accepting. As Portugal to England, also Spain could become more of a burden than an ally to Germany, due to their fragility. 

On 16 October 1940, Serrano Suñer is appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, leading to the total triumph-German faction in this country. Suñer no secret of their desire for annexation of Portugal, and even tell Ribbentrop (the German foreign minister) that geographically speaking, Portugal has no right to exist [22] (September 16, 1940), and Francesco Laquio (Italian ambassador in Madrid) that Portugal should be part of a great Spain. [23]. 

After a whirlwind visit to Madrid of Admiral Canaris, Hitler was definitely convinced that Spain is not prepared for war. Regardless of the efforts of Mussolini with Franco, Spain has not declared war on the Allies, thus serving the interests of British and Portuguese. A year later, in 1942, signed the treaty known as Block or Iberian Peninsular which ultimately put an end to the hegemonic tendencies of Spain on the Peninsula, though he can not influence and change the position of Franco relation to the forces of the Axis. You will need to wait until the autumn of 1943 to the chief of the neighboring country takes over the neutrality and withdraw from the eastern front the famous División Azul, 18,000 volunteers. 

Once away from the war, Portugal is now in a delicate situation. The Portuguese population deals with the war every day: The theme of war takes care of spaces: the underground walls painted with V for victory, the newspaper billboards, shop windows, (...) are filled with posters. People carry badges, distributing pamphlets, (...) with propaganda articles (...). The conflict (...) is the topic of conversation in coffee; of rows at the door of establishments (...). [24]. 

The Portuguese government strives to maintain an equidistant neutrality, even under the force of the idea of ??the invincibility of the German armies and the pressure forces germanófilas in Portugal, trying to view, aided by the propaganda of Berlin, the ideals that British people are a threat serious threat to the survival of the Estado Novo. Exacerbated by the contacts established by the British with the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party to organize a resistance in the event of German invasion, relations between Lisbon and London deteriorate. As an example of germanófilas trends existed for some time of the Portuguese, there is a letter from Lieutenant Gonçalves de Andrade to Adolf Hitler in 1936, asking for urgent help to create an anti-European League of opposing the Soviet danger [25]. 

The June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union and win the final status of flagship anti-communism. 

The Iberian Peninsula then passes into the background. 

In Portugal is felt to some degree the support of some media and anti Germanophiles the German invasion. To highlight the support of the Portuguese Legion, the organization reportedly affects the German cause. It is therefore the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Germans that causes a clear assumption of the Portuguese Legion of your germanofilismo. For the first time, published a position of clear alignment struggle developed by the Nazis through a work order issued on July 10, 1941 by the Central Board of the Portuguese Legion in the Daily News. [26] Against Moscow win ! (...) Can not remain indifferent to the campaign of liberation from oppression red no nation, no people, no nationalism, against Moscow who want to align the order; march the legions of the world, armies honorable defenders of the homeland, (. ..). The legionnaire Portuguese as nationalist and Christian is, above all, anti-Communist. [27]. 

Besides the Portuguese Legion, other personalities support the German cause. Among them Fernando dos Santos Costa (Secretary of State of War), Ortins Manuel Bettencourt (Minister of the Navy), John Costa Leite (Lumbrales, responsible for one of the first Portuguese Legion and finance minister at the ministerial reshuffle on 28 August 1941) and Mario Figueiredo (Minister of National Education on the same date). On the other hand, supporters of England were, among others, Marcelo Caetano (then National Commissioner of the Portuguese Youth), Peter Teotonio Pereira (ambassador in Madrid), Anthony Ferro (Director of SPN) and Captain Lawrence Augustine (responsible for PVED). 

The economic blockade decreed by England in 1940 to Portugal and Spain sets the tone for the worsening relations Luso-Iberian. Proposed by Hugh Dalton, Minister of the British economy, under the pretext, though neutral, countries of the Iberian Peninsula enemy territories are contiguous, this blockade has put the economy in serious difficulties. Come, on the other hand, encourage greater trade with Germany and the loosening of traditional ties with Britain. When the United States adopt the same economic measures of the English on the Peninsula, our country is going to Germany to buy the raw materials it needs, as well as some basic necessities in exchange for Portuguese wolfram, so important to the effort German war [28]. 

The worsening crisis between Portugal and England happens when the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 16, 1942, which received harsh criticism of Salazar, outlined in his speech to the microphones of the national broadcaster, on 25 June: I refer especially to the undeniable disturbance of spirits caused by the Anglo-Russian and the painful anxiety that can sense everywhere, (...) by virtue of solidarity borrowed by English and American democracies to the Soviet government. [29]. 

Avowed supporter of anti-communism, Salazar had already said on 9 October 1939, the National Assembly about the ideological crisis that lived within Europe, which (...) of people are wondering if there will still be anxious about, in within this debacle, the place of truth, honor, justice, the legitimacy of law, the common good of men and nations. Nor can we believe (...) that a nation like Russia, which denied these principles is exactly who's coming (...) help to restore them in Western Europe. [30]. 

Responding to accusations of partiality British, at a time when, as we see, the Anglo-Portuguese relations have experienced better days, Salazar defends the Portuguese neutrality saying that Dresser or awkward, selfish or not, neutrality is not only advantageous while serving the interest national (...). [31]. At this point the Estado Novo is the connoted hopelessly germanofilismo. They shall be such conferences anticommunist, promoted by the National Union of National Radio in July to December 1942. The German propaganda gains strength in anti-Portuguese feeling, whereas advertisement English, focusing on the exaltation of the strong resistance of the Red Army and Soviet people, is in itself an obstacle Salazar: it is he that says he is not willing to allow the England becomes a channel for Soviet propaganda. 

However, the Portuguese head of state is concerned to maintain good relations with both belligerents blocks. Although the national feeling at this stage is post-maioritariamene German Salazar tries to keep the balance of Portuguese foreign policy, even leading the British ambassador Campbell write in the letter dated March 7, 1942, which (...) this is not a symptom of ill will (...) Dr. Salazar himself, who is extremely careful not to reveal too much on his mind is obviously sympathetic to the British cause [32]. On the other hand, Goebbels, the propaganda minister of the Third Reich, writes in his diary, a year later, Salazar made ??a speech yesterday extraordinarily anti-Bolshevik, however, was not public. (...) It is sufficient, however, to conclude that while Salazar in Portugal is in power, nothing will be really hostile against us. [33]. 

Alongside this equidistant posture that Salazar seems to want to keep you grow in Portugal a real anti-American sentiment. Salazar's contempt for the new power, aided by the press (including the Daily News) and by advertising, where Antonio Ferro is responsible for destroying the American popular culture and give the idea of ??America as a country of dark business and gangsters, foster a sense of anti-Americanism in the Portuguese population. Roosevelt will pay later, during the negotiations about the Azores, the image ofmillionaire anti-colonialist and reformist [34] it is established in Portugal.



The Question of Timor

On December 17, 1941 Dutch and Australian troops landed in East Timor under the pretext of defending the Portuguese territory of the threat of invasion nipónica. The Portuguese Empire, hitherto untouched, is directly affected by the tide of war. 

Australia seeks to ensure the control of an island so close to his own territory, and the Netherlands want to guard against the Japanese invasion and protect his empire in Indonesia today. 

Portugal does not prevent this unexpected landing. On the one hand, seeks to avoid a situation of open conflict with the two countries, on the other hand, the small garrison of Timor is unable to cope with the invaders. It is with this last point that the Australians and Dutch underpin and justify the invasion: they want to help Portugal fight the impending Japanese invasion - The Resident Koepang, accompanied by the Australian Consul Ross (...) presented to the governor of the colony requiring an Ultimatum consent to the landing of the Austro-Dutch troops intended to occupy Dili, because they believe an imminent attempt by the Japanese to settle in the Portuguese Timor (...) [35]. 

Again comes Salazar ask for explanations for the English, guilty in his eyes, of negligence. The contingent sent to Mozambique to strengthen the garrison at Dili does not arrive in time: the Japanese invade Timor on February 19, 1942, and expel the Dutch and Australian troops. Salazar protested by diplomatic means, but without ever losing sight of the risk that would antagonize Japan: Portugal lose definitely Timor and also Macau, surrounded by the Japanese army in southern China. 

Thus, the relations between our country and Japan are not as affected as expected. In 1942, the two countries that celebrate four centuries of bilateral relations. 

On the other hand, the 23 June the same year, Salazar tells Britain's readiness to help their military allies to expel the Japanese from the island. This position is not unlike that of the head of the Portuguese state feared the annexation Australian Timor. The ability of ambiguous diplomatic Salazar again puts our country in a neutral position that can please the two warring parties without seriously undermining Portugal. 


 

 

From late 1942 until the end of the war

The last phase of Portuguese foreign policy from World War II begins at the end of 1942 and lasted until 1945. 

It is precisely at the end of 1942 the tide of war changes: Rommel and his Afrika Korps are defeated at El Alamein and begins to retreat to the west, the Americans after the Pearl Harbor disaster, beginning to win the first victories in the Pacific The Germans suffer a setback at Stalingrad and the Allies landed in North Africa (Operation Torch). This last event, which by their proximity to the Portuguese territory and Spanish, can lead to deterioration of relations between the Iberian countries and their allies, notably Britain, the British government deserves special attention. Aware that the fortunes of war began to change extreme, Campbell wrote to Salazar to tell you that taking into account the close relations between Portugal and Spain, and the weight it attaches in Madrid to the opinion of Your Excellency, I venture to suggest consider the usefulness to inform the Spanish government of this message and use its influence to reassure regarding the intentions of His Majesty's Government and the U.S. government, whose desire is to save the Iberian Peninsula to the horrors of war and see not only Portugal but also Spain take their place in peace and prosperity in the postwar world. [36]. 

It is Churchill himself who writes a message to Salazar, to ensure that our country would not be in any way harmed or forced to abandon its neutrality (which served the British) because of military operations in North Africa: The area operations is neighboring Portugal and Spain, and in view of the close and friendly relations between our two nations based on the centuries since the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, I wish to assure you that government is the firm intention of His Majesty and U.S. government not to involve Portugal nor Spain (...) in hostilities that result from those operations. [37]. Even President Franklin Roosevelt, head of state, indeed, a country for which Salazar harbored some contempt, writes the president of the county, telling him I hope you accept my security solemn that his country has nothing to fear of the reasons that determine the United States. [38]. 

In 1943 the Axis forces withdraw permanently from North Africa, the Germans are desperately trying to halt the Russian counterattack on the eastern front, the Allies invaded Sicily and Mussolini in Italy falls. There is now a new reality that Portugal can not close our eyes: the allies seek in their relations with the neutrals (and consequently with Portugal) responses to ensure their political and strategic needs, since their main concern is to bring the success their offensive operations on Europe. 

Ideologically opposed regimes allies, the Portuguese Salazarism is even called into question the hypothesis of this cripple some applications vital to the allies. This is the case with the two great issues of this period: the problems of provision of facilities in the Azores to the British military and the requirement of an embargo on the sale of wolfram to the Germans [39]. Although the diplomatic route is always preferred, it is certain that the overthrow of Salazar comes to be worked out by the British. 

Changing the course of the war also affects Portugal ideological level: the prospect of victory of the democracies, and even worse, of Bolshevism on the European totalitarianism begins to emerge on the horizon. Politically and ideologically far from the allies, Salazar seeks to maintain neutrality which serves Portuguese interests, stating, however, its distance from the Allied powers. 

Believer in the defeat of the axis, but eager for a negotiated peace that Germany allows the maintenance of the status of "guardian of Europe" against Russian Bolshevism, Salazar, with the support of Franco, carries out an unsuccessful attempt to convince the allies to negotiate a separate peace with the Nazis. The allies had, however, another goal: to force Germany to surrender unconditionally. 

In 1942 comes the Iberian block, during the visit of Count Jordana to Portugal in December. This is the beginning of the passage of non belligerence Spanish to neutrality. The Iberian peninsula is unified on the principle of separation of war and ideological conflict in Europe. 

Salazar becomes aware of the new reality: On the one hand, Germany can not resist the allied forces, on the other hand, the serious economic difficulties and social Portuguese (aggravated by bad agricultural years, drought, smuggling, etc.). They have in its base the Allied blockade may prove to be strengthened as a countermeasure. You are given the tone for the Portuguese foreign policy to monitor the progress of the war and serve the interests of our country. It is time to embark on a neutral cooperating with allies. 

Using all his skills as a diplomat and negotiator, Salazar sells expensive the new position of Portugal before the conflict: all the concessions made to the allies are paid the highest price possible. Campbell writes the British ambassador in July 1943: When I predicted that when the day of our victory approached, relations with this country that would complicate rather than facilitate. Now we have entered that stage. [40]. Campbell had been right in their predictions. 

Thus, Salazar seeks to ensure the safety of the system regardless of the fortunes of war, warning that Portugal will not submit to the winners. Ensure, in exchange for his cooperation, the supply of fuel, food, raw materials, etc.. that minimize the internal crisis in Portugal. Rendibilizando the most politically neutral cooperating to safeguard the survival of the regime and the Colonial Empire. 

In two major disputes of this period (the Azores and tungsten), the Portuguese head of state gives the limit of discussions when their intransigence would already be a suicide.Always looking to take compensatory economic negotiations, Salazar and his regime are a nuisance. Armindo Monteiro says that (...) to boot to the Chairman of any decision it takes to shine in his eyes the material gains that the state can take the current negotiations. [41]. 

When, on June 8, 1943 Campbell presents the request to Salazar English military facilities in the Azores, this opposes him, just five days later, an agreement of principle which gives rise to lengthy and arduous political negotiations, military and economic. 

The long and expensive process of negotiations almost led to a British military intervention in the national territory, which was already, in fact, thought: the operation lifebelt.Churchill wrote to Roosevelt to tell him of his frustration (...) I see no moral substance in legalistic argument that one should not tread the Portuguese neutrality in relation to some unimportant islands in peacetime but which have acquired a meaning vital in time of war. [42]. But Salazar signed the agreement in time: in secret, August 17, 1943. In addition to obtaining guarantees to safeguard the British Empire Portuguese, Portugal establishes a new agreement bend economic affairs and shipping facilities. This agreement is, however, frozen until June 1944, when Portugal finally gives in to pressure and decrees the Allied embargo of wolfram to Germany. 

That is ending the war, Salazar presents itself as the leader of a country engaged in the Allied cause, but as a leader like himself, worried about the consequences of the victory of U.S. forces, British and Soviet. Is essentially concerned to distinguish the first two of the latter. Life has surprises do think, almost all of Europe was hit and ruined for opposing the "new order" of German design, but is on its ruins still smoldering that seen spreading the "new communist order." Now this is by definition exclusive and irreconcilable with the concept of civilization they are proud of the other hegemonies. Europe has to choose. [43rd].



The Question of tungsten - The Agreements with Germany

The tungsten is an important mineral for the war effort of the two blocks in conflict. Initially, it is Germany that is privileged with the agreement of January 24, 1942, as a result of the encounter between Salazar and Hanz Eltze, director of the German Legation in Lisbon on 31 October last year. This agreement leaves the commitment of the Portuguese government control the price of tungsten, in exchange for a hundred thousand tons of iron, so necessary to the construction and shipbuilding, as well as other products at reasonable prices. 

The establishment of the agreement had been suggested by the German government, through its economic adviser to the German Legation (Eltze), which was always present in negotiations. It is written the text finalize the agreement, Portugal will seek to provide 3,000 tons of tungsten, an average of 250 tons per month, 150 $ 00 per pound. In return, you receive ten thousand tons of ammonium sulfate, 300 railway wagons of 15 tons, drums and machines and 60 000 tons of iron and steel prices before the war. 

Following the meetings and to strengthen this first agreement, in the first months of 1942, comes another agreement, dated January 24 this year. In this agreement, which ends on March 1, 1943, Portugal is obliged to provide the German government or the companies he indicated, the amount of 2,800 tons of tungsten concentrate, at a price of 150 $ 00 a pound.In return, Germany exports to Portugal the following goods: 60 000 tons of iron, half built, such as rails, plates, wire, etc.., 500 freight cars, railway, 10 thousand tons of ammonium sulphate; drums iron to the value of DM 450 000, 2 000 tonnes of newsprint. 

The transport of tungsten is done entirely by the Germans, from Portugal. They were in the same way that the Germans had the transport costs of goods that came to Portugal to the border with Spain, the place from which the charges are the responsibility of Portuguese companies. 

They then begin the difficulties in fulfilling the agreement. If Germany has to dispense materials that make you miss the war effort, Portugal combat the shortage of ore, pressure from allies and smuggling. 

A final agreement is signed by Salazar and the envoy extraordinary Oswald Baron Hoyningen-Huene, on April 21, 1943, with anticipated duration until 29 February 1944. 

Portugal then provides 2,100 tonnes of tungsten 150 $ 00 a pound in exchange for the same kind of material contained in the previous agreement, amounting to approximately 31,433,000 marks, which represent 90% of tungsten exports, with the remaining 10% paid currency. 

Products to be supplied to Portugal stand out iron rails, plates and wires, 500 freight cars, railway, 1,000 wheels for cars and 200 trucks-OPEL BLITZ in the amount of 2,000,000 marks.All goods are sold at prices of 1938, except for the increase from 10% to 20,000 tons of iron. It should be noted that the continuing obligation of the Portuguese government to keep the price of tungsten stable 150 $ 00 per pound, allowing the Germans great advantages over black-market prices (between 500 and 1,000 shells per pound). 

Our country continues, however, struggling with a shortage of ore. Salazar says that it is possible that the ore delivered does not exceed two thirds of that amount. [44]. Salazar is right: as in previous agreements, the Germans did not have the required values ??are reached. At the end of the period of validity there is a deficit of 550 tonnes.



The Question of tungsten - Lock and Economic Agreements with the Allies

After March 1942, when cutting off the supply of tungsten from the east to Germany, our country is subject to a number of external pressures in order to control the trade of the Portuguese wolfram. At this point, the axis is those most in need of our ore, since the allies still have alternative sources of supply, particularly in Burma. 

The struggle of the Allied forces is at this point, primarily diplomatic, and aims to cut that has become the main source of supply shaft. In Britain now dominates much of the production of tungsten in Portugal: the company Beralt Tin controls it. Thus England seeks to ensure the dominance in mining law, which was already his, but also tries to buy most of the ore mined illegally by farmers. 

In March 1942 Britain and the United States intensified the economic blockade of the Iberian Peninsula. The division and use of products, control of its export surplus and are now in possession of an Anglo-American Committee, based in the United States, holder, Salazar's second largest economic power that anyone has had in the world. [45]. No product can be imported by Portugal, even from the colonies, without prior authorization through the British Navicert systems (document certifying that the goods are not smuggled), which regulate the import quotas of goods. 

Used not only against Portugal, but also against other neutral countries, the economic blockade is as powerful a weapon of war. Quotas are set by England always below the needs of our country, so that there is the temptation to export the excess to the enemy, through smuggling. 

Aggravated by the outbreak of war on the Eastern Front in 1941, the Portuguese gained trading wolfram dimensions never expected. Twice (in November 1941 and March 1942) the Portuguese government tries to take control of the mineral trade, and both times the measures are the already fragile relations falter Luso-British. 

The end of fear of the Allied powers in relation to what measures seem to be germanófilas gives the agreement between Britain, the United States of America and our country, on August 24, 1942, between Salazar and the ambassador of Great Britain Ronald H. Campbell. 

The agreement provides a cap of 4,000 tons for export of Anglo-American mines, plus 50% of the ore free. Remember, as presented above, that exports to Germany are limited to 2,800 tons (a number that includes the mines and ore free). This agreement is also a commitment Portuguese to suppress the illegal purchase of tungsten and its smuggling. This measure applies in particular to Germany, this medium has a way to overcome their share. 

But the allies are not completely satisfied with the situation, since the German contraband not slow down, and it is precisely at the time they prepare to propose a new agreement more advantageous than Salazar presents another alternative agreement with Germany of tungsten . The new agreement raises serious expressions of displeasure by the allies. For them, the purchase of tungsten, more than satisfy the need that Britain and the United States have it, prevents the Germans reached by underground. 

In this new situation, the allies meet only at the extension (July 1943) the agreement of August 1942, putting aside the idea of ??retaliation in the field of supplies in order not to prejudice the negotiations of the Azores. 

However, in January 1944, the Allies intensified their strategic maneuvers cutting the supply lines of raw materials to Germany. Consequently, the Luso-British relations enter a new phase: the ambassador in Lisbon Campbell presents a new position that requires the English embargo on exports of wolfram to Germany. The question is no longer purely commercial to be made strategically. 

Campbell meets with Salazar on Jan. 23 to tell him and reaffirm the importance of cutting metals to Germany. In this field, since Portugal is the only source of German imports of tungsten. 

A German attack on the Iberian peninsula is almost definitely out of the horizon, but Salazar did not hesitate to use this argument to sell any expensive transfer agreements with allies. 

However, the British political and diplomatic pressures (with personal intervention of Churchill and General Smuts and others) give their fruit.



The Question of tungsten - The Embargo Total Exports of Tungsten

Although Salazar always resist the idea that the embargo be considered fatal for Germany, which in turn will enable the advancement of the Red armies on the eastern front, ends up yielding to pressure checks when they begin to endanger the integrity of the Portuguese colonial empire and survival of the regime. Looking to buy time in a skilful way of trading that allows you to make diplomatic maneuvers aimed at bringing added value to Portugal, Salazar protested vehemently with Campbell, who notes that the ban represents a loss from 9 to 10 million pounds per year for Portuguese economy, as well as unemployment 80-100 wolfram mine workers. In this respect, says Yves Léonard: in most cases it is as if, conscious of having to give (...) the pressure exerted by the allies skillfully through the sea blockade and the limitation provisions, Salazar sought to accumulate ( ...), obstacles and legal maneuvers in order to create (...), a conflict that, at the last minute, would eventually be able to resolve, not without first obtaining (...) some advantages in the form compensation or additional guarantees. [46]. 

But not this time - England does not allow further delays, and on June 3 Salazar officially responds positively to the request English. 

On June 12 the government decrees in the Federal government's overall closure of the mines and the end of wolfram exports. Internally, the measure is upheld as a test of faithfulness to the alliance with England. 

The Allied blockade of Germany is now complete. In August 1944 the German-Iberian communications know one end. 

At war's end, the question of tungsten over, familiar with the matter of the Azores, a Portuguese and serve the interests of the scheme, being the same for a period of time, as the engine of the Portuguese economy. 

The Allies, ending the war that is, show up clearly in favor of maintaining the system, and give guarantees of protection of the Portuguese empire. 

Salazar can, either through agreement on the Azores to England (and later with the U.S.), as accepted by the embargo of wolfram, signing the agreement on January 26, 1945, that meets the immediate needs of our country . 

Finally, the business of war made possible the accumulation of gold and money essential to the economic development of post war. 

One point is settled for us - we will not make a business of war, and this principle will dominate Portugal's relations with foreign countries, also with us for so doing. [47]. 

Salazar was mistaken: the tungsten was a business of war, which ultimately benefited greatly from the Portuguese economy.

 

Question of the Azores

The Atlantic islands are geographically vital to the area of the Atlantic Ocean and a forward base (or Outpost, as you call José Freire Antunes) for Americans. 

But if Salazar has in mind the British Luso Alliance and historical links between English and Portuguese people, nourished by the United States of America a real contempt and dislike. Viewed as the banner of neo-liberalism and democracy that Salazar insists on so thoroughly rid of Portugal. The U.S. does not reap the same in our country that the British sympathies. 

Concerned with the protection of the Atlantic after the fall of France and the weakening of the British Navy, the U.S. take for granted the outlet of the Atlantic islands by the Axis forces as soon as they invade the Iberian Peninsula. 

Thus, there is a need to sensitize the American public to the dangers that were derived from the capture of Cape Verde and the Azores especially by the Germans, would be a greater threat to America than the conquest of Hawaii by the Japanese (...) should therefore be immediately made ??clear in this country that the Azores are of interest so vital to America as Martinique or Bermuda and Newfoundland, and that no action should be deleted to make the occupation of the Azores by the Axis powers an impossibility. [ 48]. 

Taking for granted the invasion by German forces from the Peninsula, Britain outlines secret plans for the military defense of our country, who spend up to the creation of an agenda of sending a British force in Portugal. These guidelines are in line with the wishes of Armindo Monteiro, who wants closer ties between the two countries. Salazar slows the process again, and calms the outbursts of the Portuguese ambassador Anglophiles. 

We are then in a period of extreme sensitivity, in which Germany and America accuse each other of plans for the occupation of the Azores. Eager to drag the U.S. into the war, Churchill proposed to Roosevelt to send an American squadron to patrol the islands as a means of intimidation Hiter so it does not act in response to a possible British invasion to the Azores, and also in the form of pressure under Salazar. However, Portuguese receantes reaction to this patrol, the American decline the invitation of the chief of English, and defend an occupation of the islands only and only if the Germans attacked. Likewise diplomatic ask Churchill to inform Lisbon and Madrid in the case of the occupation to be a clear objective, to which Churchill replied that it would be like to inform Berlin. The same is striving to show Roosevelt that the annexation of the Azores had nothing to do with the increase of English territory, but only to the defense of British interests and territory in the war, and that the Portuguese sovereignty would be restored after the conflict . 

In early May 1941, after the German victories in Greece and Cyrenaica, Roosevelt began to advocate a position of greater interventionism. The May 7, the occupation of the Azores figure even in Second American priorities of Staff, soon after the Dakar. A week later, Roosevelt ordered three warships and some aircraft leave Pearl Harbour and join the U.S. fleet in the Atlantic. At the same time, involving West Africa north of the equator, the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the integration of the Monroe Doctrine (protection of American interests, as is known). The May 22, Roosevelt asked the Admiral Harold Stark preparation of an occupation force of the Portuguese archipelago within 30 days (2500 men). On the day the American president gives the order to prepare the attack on the Azores, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, two German warships, sink the British cruise Hood and seriously damage the Prince of Wales. In addition to a serious moral defeat for the British navy, the German maritime threat is felt in the area of ??the Azores. And this would remain true to the sinking of the Bismarck along the French coast by the English Air Force on 27 May. 

Although some German generals endeavored to persuade Hitler to invade the Azores, it prefers to wait for the end of Operation Barbarossa before breaking American neutrality, so that the war effort of Germany and could drive one to the Western Front (England and USA). Anyway run sporadic acts of aggression, such as the sinking of the merchant ship Robin Moor (May 21), which are enjoyed by Churchill to push the Americans to war. 

The anti-Americanism Salazar continues to undermine the relations between Portugal and the United States. When Roosevelt informed Churchill of his intention to send a secret emissary to Lisbon to ask Salazar of their willingness to ask for assistance to the U.S. and Britain in defense of the Azores, where the Germans invaded the Iberian Peninsula and the Portuguese government was forced to take refuge in the archipelago, receives an answer from Churchill to the same information they had received a communication that Salazar opened the door to an understanding about the Luso-British islands, and thus would be beneficial to keep the U.S. and its influence outside process, at least for now. 

However, in a speech on May 27, Roosevelt made it clear that the United States consider the Azorean islands a key strategic point in the defense of American territory. 

The British and American interests intersect once again, while the political turmoil in Portugal is increasing as a response to Roosevelt's speech and how it relates to the Portuguese islands. Salazar announced Churchill, May 30, that any American attitude that ignores the Portuguese sovereignty in the islands would be understood as an act of aggression against Portugal. 

In August 1941, Franco sent to the Russian front the famous Blue Division on behalf of the anticommunist struggle. Churchill and Roosevelt as logic assume the abandonment of Spanish neutrality, and the famous Atlantic conference addresses again the hypothesis of the occupation of the Azores. 

This conference comes the idea that (...) the two (U.S. and UK) have agreed that the letter (which Salazar was sent to Churchill) was highly satisfactory and that made ??it possible without any difficulty, planning the occupation of the Azores, to ensure that the islands are not occupied by Germany. [49]. 

However, Portugal continues to take refuge in alliance with England to rule the United States in the negotiations. 

In 1943, the allied convoys of ships sailing in the Atlantic are relatively easy prey for German U-boats, even with the strengthening of the U.S. air patrols of the ocean. The Portuguese occupation of the islands is discussed again in secret conference Trident (Roosevelt and Churchill meet with their respective military chiefs in Washington in May 1943), which he left to conclude that the Azores were a vital point for the conduct of the war anti U-boats. 

This goes against the operation lifebelt (seat belt), aimed at the occupation of the Azores in the short term. Under British leadership, joint British and American forces would take the islands. At this stage, Churchill has lost patience with Salazar, and although always give precedence to diplomatic means, the English head of state announced his war cabinet thatpersonally, I am prepared, if the U.S. join us (...) does not to address only the Portuguese but also to make them know if they create difficulties in which we intend to seize on these islands (...) and hopefully this can be done without bloodshed. It would be easier for them to surrender, under protest, (...) even going so far as to cut off diplomatic relations with us than be complicit or openly admit such a violation of its neutrality. [50]. 

Salazar realizes that the two heads of state allies begin to focus on other ways other than diplomatic. Fearing an attack coupled with Azorean islands (which, as we see, was being prepared and would be implemented soon), and a diplomatic maneuver which is clearly aimed to gain more time, Salazar calls the June 8, Ambassador Ronald Campbell, to discuss again the foundations of the strategic issue of the Azores. Arguing that the Allied successes in North Africa it impossible certainly a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, Salazar commits to use the Atlantic islands as a base of resistance if this happened. With this measure, the chairman can once again ensure the territorial integrity of Portuguese. 

The relations between our country and improve allies (notably England). On June 18, Campbell asks Salazar officially facilities in the Azorean islands for the British. Remember the Portuguese dictator Luso-British alliance, strives to make you see that the tide of war is clearly favorable to the allies, and that a German invasion of the peninsula is now very unlikely. Salazar shows for the first time more flexible. 

For Roosevelt, however, the possibility of entry of Hitler's troops on the peninsula can not be excluded. The American president proposes to Churchill to send allied troops to defend the Portuguese territory, but he declines the idea, assuring Roosevelt that Salazar intends to maintain the neutrality of Portugal at all costs. It is established that the troops only enter Portuguese territory if it so wishes Salazar, that neutrality is not compromised, and that is not given the Germans an excuse to invade the peninsula. 

On August 17, 1943 to sign the agreement that gives the British the right to use the facilities of the port of Horta and Ponta Delgada and Lajes airfields and Rabo de Peixe. The United States is out of the agreement, and feel betrayed by the British, they ensure that, after entry into the Azores, on October 8, it will do for Portugal also accepts the presence of American troops. 

Seeing their interests exceeded, the United States abandon the policy of diplomatic allegiance to England (in the negotiations with Portugal, of course), and expose a U.S. plan to use the Azorean islands. Unrealistic Churchuill cataloged by the U.S. demands far exceeded those that had been granted to the British. The English Head of State called the attention of Roosevelt to the difficulties of diplomatic relations with Portugal, and warns that the public disclosure of the plan would only serve to scare the Portuguese, and harm the interests of the allied forces. 

The war is not going well to the Germans, losing ground in Russia and the Allies enter Naples. It is not anticipated, so any German retaliation on the decision of Salazar, and Spain itself has already secured the dictator who would not react to the permanence of British troops in the Azores. Nevertheless, Salazar lessens risk to ensure that Germany providing tungsten would not be interrupted. 

It is also at this time that Armindo Monteiro accuses Salazar of benefiting Germany, which earns him a dismissal of the office he holds. 

Henceforth, Salazar responds to Clause friends to friends, foes to foes who insist on quoting the U.S. to assert its interests in the Azores with a key argument: that Portugal regarding this clause, but that the treaty only with England, and not with the United Nations, so there is no obligation to facilitate the Portuguese American entry in the islands. Behind this argument is what is known: a profound aversion to ideological Salazar United States of America. 

However, with the allied victory to emerge on the horizon, Salazar begins to sag: U.S. military technicians may already be grounded Açoreano if they are disguised as civilian pilots and technicians of the Pan American, the company has authorization to construct airfields in the Azores. 

It follows a period of negotiation in which Salazar will gradually giving up authorizing, on July 19, 1944, the operations of a squadron of American planes under the command and distinctive English and American English. 

The end of the problem arises only on November 28, 1944, with the agreement signed between Portugal and the United States of America, which ultimately provide a focus for a policy of transatlantic cooperation that Salazar so long resisted. 

Bibliography 

ANDRADE, José Gonçalves 
1937, Dr. Oliveira Salazar: his time and his work, publishing National Education, Port 

Antunes, José Freire 
1993, Salazar-Caetano: secret letters from 1932 to 1968, circle of readers, Lisbon 

Antunes, José Freire 
1991, Kennedy and Salazar, Cultural Diffusion, Lisbon 

Antunes, José Freire 
1995, Roosevelt, Churchill and Salazar - The fight for the Azores, Ediclube, Madrid 

BOBBIO, Norberto; Matteucci, Nicola; Pasquino, Gianfranco 
S / date, Dictionary of Politics, publisher University of Brasília, Volumes I and II, 8. Edition, s / local 

BRADLEY, Catherine 
S / date, Hitler and 3. Third Reich, Asa editions, Lisbon 

Paperback, Costa 
1937, Salazar and the truth, publisher national education, Porto 

Paperback, Costa 
1949, to the Story of a regime, publishing empire, Lisbon 

CARRILHO, Mary, ROSES, Fernando; Barros, Julia, NEVES, Mario; OLIVEIRA, José Manuel; Matos-Cruz, José 
1989, Portugal in World War II, Publications Don Quixote, Lisbon 

DACOSTA, Fernando 
1957, Salazar masks, editorial news, 3rd edition, Lisbon 

D'ASSAC, Ploncard 
1952, The Salazarism, national publishing company, Lisbon 

STAR, Albano 
1999, The memories that Salazar did not write, edits Asa Rio Tinto 

IRON, Antonio 
S / date, Salazar, editions of Temple, Texas 

Georgel, Jaques 
1970, Franco and Francoism, Publications Don Quixote, Lisbon 

Gil, José 
1995, Salazar: the rhetoric of invisibility, water clock editors, Lisbon 

GILBERT, Martin 
1989, The Second World War, Volumes I and II, Publications Don Quixote, Lisbon 

LÉONARD, Yves 
1996, Salazarism and Fascism, editorial survey, Mem Martins 

LIBERATO, Antonio Oliveira 
S / date, The case of Timor, editor Portugalia, Lisbon 

LAUREL, Francis de Sales Mascarenhas 
S / date, The Salazarism, IV National Congress of the Union, s / local 

LORENZO, Eduardo 
1976, Fascism never existed, Publications Don Quixote, Lisbon 

LUCENA, Manuel 
1994, the Salazar regime and its development, conferences Matosinhos, Contemporary Publishing, Matosinhos 

Malpique, Cruz 
1946, Identity card of António de Oliveira Salazar, editor of Metropolitan Home, Luanda 

MANUEL, Alexander, kinky, Rogério; NEVES, Days 
1974, PIDE - the story of repression, editor of the Journal Fundão 

Lupus, Joseph (Directorate) 
1994, History of Portugal, volume VII, circle of readers, Lisbon 

WALNUT, Franco 
1978, Salazar - the major crises (1936-1945), Atlantis editor, volume III, Coimbra 

PEPPER, Alfredo 
1937, On the eve of the new state, bookstore Tavares Martins, Porto 

PRESTON, Paul 
1995, Franco, Fontana Press, London 

Rodrigues, Luís Nuno Valdez Faria 
1994, the Portuguese Legion, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon 

ROSES, Fernando 
1988, The Salazarism and Luso-British alliance, editorial Fragments, s / local 

ROSES, Fernando; BRANDÃO DE BRITO, JM (Directorate) 
1996 Dictionary of the state again, circle of readers, Volumes I and II, Lisbon 

SALAZAR, Antonio Oliveira 
1959 Speeches and political notes, Volumes I, II, III and IV, 2nd and 4th editions, Coimbra 

Saraiva, Jose Antonio, and other 
1998, Salazar without masks, New Torn publisher, Lisbon 

HAIL, José Hermano 
1993, History of Portugal, Europe-America Publications, Lisbon 

SOUSA VILAR, Antonio de Almeida 
1996, Tungsten The Arouca in the context of World War II, University Portucalense, Porto 

1949, Franco en Portugal, y acts speeches, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid

Other Sources

Diciopédia, great encyclopedic dictionary of multimedia publishing Harbour, s / date 

Foundation Oliveira Salazar, in Internet 

Great chronicle of II. World War, Volumes I, II and III, selections of Reader's Digest, Venda Nova, 1975 

Social Movements and Power of 2 minutes. Paragraphs international summer courses Cascais, Cascais, 1995 

Academic Journal, no. 0 º (April-May), Autonomous University of Lisbon, 1999 

Express Magazine, n. º 1353.3 October 1998 

History Magazine, no. 117 (April / May), year XI, 1989 

History Magazine, no. Paragraphs 28 (Jan / Feb) and 34 (Aug / Sep), year XIX, 1997 

History Magazine, no. 1 (April), year XX, 1998 

Salazar, SIC-documentary series Independent Television, 1998



The english version of this article will be available soon. In the meanwhile, the text above was the result of a Google translation from portuguese version to english.


Source:
Text from the João Pedro Trigo's work.


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