On the date scheduled for the beginning of operation, September 17, the 101st Division of the U.S. should take a position near Eindhoven, opening a southern front, the 82nd Division should ensure that positions located halfway between Eindhoven and Arnhem, and shall take Nijmegen Bridge. The key point of the whole operation, the bridge of Arnhem - a hundred kilometers north of the positions of ground forces - would be left for the men of the 1st British Airborne Division, commanded by General Robert Urquarth.
The mission entrusted to Urquarth and his Red Devils did not excel in ease, as it should conquer and hold the position until the arrival of infantry and cavalry, at the risk of being isolated if the latter were caught by the enemy forces.
Unexpected difficulties
Unable to carry all the men and material in one day, Urquarth was forced to choose a location away from the Arnhem bridge to drop his men, losing the advantage of surprise and risking to suffer some casualties in the progression to the target. Upon learning that the Germans had installed a line of air defense near Arnhem, the RAF chose Renkum, twelve miles west of the target, such as launching station of the paratroopers. From there it launched the attack on Arnhem.
Halfway through the morning of September 17th, a Sunday, 4,700 British planes left their bases. At 13 hours and 30 minutes that day, the first paratroopers touched Dutch soil, and almost without resistance, advancing towards its goal.
At first everything went according to plan. The gliders and paratroopers reached the ground without any trouble, finding here and there a feeble resistance from the Germans, hailed its passage by Dutch civilians who offered them flowers, fruit and milk.
Then, contrary to expected, were forced to face two armored divisions of the SS, to understand the intentions of the Allies, has embarked on a rapid advance towards Arnhem Bridge.
Side of the Allies, caught by surprise by the value of German troops on the ground, the British 1st Airborne Brigade struggled to maintain supremacy in the areas chosen for the arrival of the second wave of assault, scheduled for tomorrow morning.
The second unpleasant surprise came when they reached the first urban and densely wooded areas, these sites, with consequences that were to prove tragic, the radios did not work, depriving the 1st Brigade of contacts among themselves and with other forces.
The huge German fire prevented the men from the 1st and 3rd Battalions to progress on the main road from Arnhem, forcing them to choose roads, a move that would waste time and mobility on the ground. Fewer problems were the men of the 2nd Battalion, under the command of John Frost, who moved along the road.
Shortly after, the calm would result in a violent battle. The onslaught of paratroopers on the south side of the bridge would prove fruitless, with German troops to repel one after another, Allied attacks. The only positive note was the inability of the commander of II SS Panzer Group, Wilhelm Bittrich, send one of its divisions to reinforce the defenses of Nijmegen.
