Question of the Azores
The Atlantic islands are geographically vital to the area of the Atlantic Ocean and a forward base (or Outpost, as you call José Freire Antunes) for Americans.
But if Salazar has in mind the British Luso Alliance and historical links between English and Portuguese people, nourished by the United States of America a real contempt and dislike. Viewed as the banner of neo-liberalism and democracy that Salazar insists on so thoroughly rid of Portugal. The U.S. does not reap the same in our country that the British sympathies.
Concerned with the protection of the Atlantic after the fall of France and the weakening of the British Navy, the U.S. take for granted the outlet of the Atlantic islands by the Axis forces as soon as they invade the Iberian Peninsula.
Thus, there is a need to sensitize the American public to the dangers that were derived from the capture of Cape Verde and the Azores especially by the Germans, would be a greater threat to America than the conquest of Hawaii by the Japanese (...) should therefore be immediately made ??clear in this country that the Azores are of interest so vital to America as Martinique or Bermuda and Newfoundland, and that no action should be deleted to make the occupation of the Azores by the Axis powers an impossibility. [ 48].
Taking for granted the invasion by German forces from the Peninsula, Britain outlines secret plans for the military defense of our country, who spend up to the creation of an agenda of sending a British force in Portugal. These guidelines are in line with the wishes of Armindo Monteiro, who wants closer ties between the two countries. Salazar slows the process again, and calms the outbursts of the Portuguese ambassador Anglophiles.
We are then in a period of extreme sensitivity, in which Germany and America accuse each other of plans for the occupation of the Azores. Eager to drag the U.S. into the war, Churchill proposed to Roosevelt to send an American squadron to patrol the islands as a means of intimidation Hiter so it does not act in response to a possible British invasion to the Azores, and also in the form of pressure under Salazar. However, Portuguese receantes reaction to this patrol, the American decline the invitation of the chief of English, and defend an occupation of the islands only and only if the Germans attacked. Likewise diplomatic ask Churchill to inform Lisbon and Madrid in the case of the occupation to be a clear objective, to which Churchill replied that it would be like to inform Berlin. The same is striving to show Roosevelt that the annexation of the Azores had nothing to do with the increase of English territory, but only to the defense of British interests and territory in the war, and that the Portuguese sovereignty would be restored after the conflict .
In early May 1941, after the German victories in Greece and Cyrenaica, Roosevelt began to advocate a position of greater interventionism. The May 7, the occupation of the Azores figure even in Second American priorities of Staff, soon after the Dakar. A week later, Roosevelt ordered three warships and some aircraft leave Pearl Harbour and join the U.S. fleet in the Atlantic. At the same time, involving West Africa north of the equator, the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the integration of the Monroe Doctrine (protection of American interests, as is known). The May 22, Roosevelt asked the Admiral Harold Stark preparation of an occupation force of the Portuguese archipelago within 30 days (2500 men). On the day the American president gives the order to prepare the attack on the Azores, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, two German warships, sink the British cruise Hood and seriously damage the Prince of Wales. In addition to a serious moral defeat for the British navy, the German maritime threat is felt in the area of ??the Azores. And this would remain true to the sinking of the Bismarck along the French coast by the English Air Force on 27 May.
Although some German generals endeavored to persuade Hitler to invade the Azores, it prefers to wait for the end of Operation Barbarossa before breaking American neutrality, so that the war effort of Germany and could drive one to the Western Front (England and USA). Anyway run sporadic acts of aggression, such as the sinking of the merchant ship Robin Moor (May 21), which are enjoyed by Churchill to push the Americans to war.
The anti-Americanism Salazar continues to undermine the relations between Portugal and the United States. When Roosevelt informed Churchill of his intention to send a secret emissary to Lisbon to ask Salazar of their willingness to ask for assistance to the U.S. and Britain in defense of the Azores, where the Germans invaded the Iberian Peninsula and the Portuguese government was forced to take refuge in the archipelago, receives an answer from Churchill to the same information they had received a communication that Salazar opened the door to an understanding about the Luso-British islands, and thus would be beneficial to keep the U.S. and its influence outside process, at least for now.
However, in a speech on May 27, Roosevelt made it clear that the United States consider the Azorean islands a key strategic point in the defense of American territory.
The British and American interests intersect once again, while the political turmoil in Portugal is increasing as a response to Roosevelt's speech and how it relates to the Portuguese islands. Salazar announced Churchill, May 30, that any American attitude that ignores the Portuguese sovereignty in the islands would be understood as an act of aggression against Portugal.
In August 1941, Franco sent to the Russian front the famous Blue Division on behalf of the anticommunist struggle. Churchill and Roosevelt as logic assume the abandonment of Spanish neutrality, and the famous Atlantic conference addresses again the hypothesis of the occupation of the Azores.
This conference comes the idea that (...) the two (U.S. and UK) have agreed that the letter (which Salazar was sent to Churchill) was highly satisfactory and that made ??it possible without any difficulty, planning the occupation of the Azores, to ensure that the islands are not occupied by Germany. [49].
However, Portugal continues to take refuge in alliance with England to rule the United States in the negotiations.
In 1943, the allied convoys of ships sailing in the Atlantic are relatively easy prey for German U-boats, even with the strengthening of the U.S. air patrols of the ocean. The Portuguese occupation of the islands is discussed again in secret conference Trident (Roosevelt and Churchill meet with their respective military chiefs in Washington in May 1943), which he left to conclude that the Azores were a vital point for the conduct of the war anti U-boats.
This goes against the operation lifebelt (seat belt), aimed at the occupation of the Azores in the short term. Under British leadership, joint British and American forces would take the islands. At this stage, Churchill has lost patience with Salazar, and although always give precedence to diplomatic means, the English head of state announced his war cabinet thatpersonally, I am prepared, if the U.S. join us (...) does not to address only the Portuguese but also to make them know if they create difficulties in which we intend to seize on these islands (...) and hopefully this can be done without bloodshed. It would be easier for them to surrender, under protest, (...) even going so far as to cut off diplomatic relations with us than be complicit or openly admit such a violation of its neutrality. [50].
Salazar realizes that the two heads of state allies begin to focus on other ways other than diplomatic. Fearing an attack coupled with Azorean islands (which, as we see, was being prepared and would be implemented soon), and a diplomatic maneuver which is clearly aimed to gain more time, Salazar calls the June 8, Ambassador Ronald Campbell, to discuss again the foundations of the strategic issue of the Azores. Arguing that the Allied successes in North Africa it impossible certainly a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, Salazar commits to use the Atlantic islands as a base of resistance if this happened. With this measure, the chairman can once again ensure the territorial integrity of Portuguese.
The relations between our country and improve allies (notably England). On June 18, Campbell asks Salazar officially facilities in the Azorean islands for the British. Remember the Portuguese dictator Luso-British alliance, strives to make you see that the tide of war is clearly favorable to the allies, and that a German invasion of the peninsula is now very unlikely. Salazar shows for the first time more flexible.
For Roosevelt, however, the possibility of entry of Hitler's troops on the peninsula can not be excluded. The American president proposes to Churchill to send allied troops to defend the Portuguese territory, but he declines the idea, assuring Roosevelt that Salazar intends to maintain the neutrality of Portugal at all costs. It is established that the troops only enter Portuguese territory if it so wishes Salazar, that neutrality is not compromised, and that is not given the Germans an excuse to invade the peninsula.
On August 17, 1943 to sign the agreement that gives the British the right to use the facilities of the port of Horta and Ponta Delgada and Lajes airfields and Rabo de Peixe. The United States is out of the agreement, and feel betrayed by the British, they ensure that, after entry into the Azores, on October 8, it will do for Portugal also accepts the presence of American troops.
Seeing their interests exceeded, the United States abandon the policy of diplomatic allegiance to England (in the negotiations with Portugal, of course), and expose a U.S. plan to use the Azorean islands. Unrealistic Churchuill cataloged by the U.S. demands far exceeded those that had been granted to the British. The English Head of State called the attention of Roosevelt to the difficulties of diplomatic relations with Portugal, and warns that the public disclosure of the plan would only serve to scare the Portuguese, and harm the interests of the allied forces.
The war is not going well to the Germans, losing ground in Russia and the Allies enter Naples. It is not anticipated, so any German retaliation on the decision of Salazar, and Spain itself has already secured the dictator who would not react to the permanence of British troops in the Azores. Nevertheless, Salazar lessens risk to ensure that Germany providing tungsten would not be interrupted.
It is also at this time that Armindo Monteiro accuses Salazar of benefiting Germany, which earns him a dismissal of the office he holds.
Henceforth, Salazar responds to Clause friends to friends, foes to foes who insist on quoting the U.S. to assert its interests in the Azores with a key argument: that Portugal regarding this clause, but that the treaty only with England, and not with the United Nations, so there is no obligation to facilitate the Portuguese American entry in the islands. Behind this argument is what is known: a profound aversion to ideological Salazar United States of America.
However, with the allied victory to emerge on the horizon, Salazar begins to sag: U.S. military technicians may already be grounded Açoreano if they are disguised as civilian pilots and technicians of the Pan American, the company has authorization to construct airfields in the Azores.
It follows a period of negotiation in which Salazar will gradually giving up authorizing, on July 19, 1944, the operations of a squadron of American planes under the command and distinctive English and American English.
The end of the problem arises only on November 28, 1944, with the agreement signed between Portugal and the United States of America, which ultimately provide a focus for a policy of transatlantic cooperation that Salazar so long resisted.
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The english version of this article will be available soon. In the meanwhile, the text above was the result of a Google translation from portuguese version to english.
